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From: Paul F Austin <paustin@digital.net>
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: The real cost of the Eurofighter
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 1998 02:04:12 GMT

Matt Clonfero wrote:

> Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Kopp.NOSPAM@aus.net> wrote:
>
>
> Media hype I can deal with. Media stupidity and errata just bore me.
>
> >ad b) the problem is rather the line of argument which claims the
> >aircraft is "almost an F-22". It is not and will never be. It is a very
> >good conventional fighter with some avionic features similar to the
> >F-22.
>
> I'd be happy to put the F-22 in a class by itself - it's the only true
> stealth air dominance fighter. I think that a number of bad calls have
> been made on the fit, but that's my opinion.
>
> The next division - modern multirole fighters with lowered observability
> - would be made up of the EF2000, the Rafale, the Gripen & the F/A-
> 18E/F. LO is a prerequisite for this division. I would put the EF2000 at
> the head of this division.
>
> Sure, this does not make the EF2000 `almost an F-22'. But it does make
> it the next best think, and more affordable for smaller air forces (that
> is, smaller that the USAF).
>
> >The F-22 IRS&T is an option, exists, but is not planned for Block 0
> >aircraft. A combined FLIR/IRS&T/laser package is under consideration for
> >Block 10, AFAIK.
>
> i.e. it's not on the F-22 as it stands.

Every fighter bought these days reflects (or should reflect) the concept
of operations (CONOPS) of the customer more than just technological
possibilities.

In the case of the F-22, it's intended to fight imbedded in a network of
sensors.  Those sensors include AWACS and ESM platforms like Rivet Joint,
space-based sensors and other F-22s. The ICNIA-based AJ/LPI data links
and receive-only Link-16 net is arguably more important than the LPI
APG-77 as a source of information for F-22 pilots.

You can think of a group of F-22s operating in that network in the same
way submarines operate, with a "non-discretion rate" being the frequency
with which any particular platform makes an emission. The network allows
most of the aircraft, most of the time, to know most of what the network
knows. Because of its nature, the network is tolerant of outages to any
particular platform as long as the outages don't persist for long
periods. That's the major reason the USAF was able to forgo an IRST: the
increase in discrete observation for any single F-22 equiped with IRSTs
is small compared to observation rate of the network as a whole without
it.

When an enemy has to fight F-22 within the F-22's environment, it's a
tough proposition. The LO characteristics of the F-22, combined with high
supersonic persistence and low duty cycle required of on-board active
sensors on any single F-22 means that the enemy won't know with any
precision where the opposing fighters are and will have very little time
to manuever to counter them.

The corresponding counter argument that the F-22 force has it's
effectiveness cut tremendously outside its network is obviously true. The
same is true for e.g. a single Aegis platform compared to a CEC net or an
isolated battalion compared to fully net'ed units in a digital surface
battle force. The point is that an enemy is unlikely to encounter an F-22
in a one-on-one engagement.

The design characteristics of the F-22 are selected _because_ of the
CONOPS. The question is whether an countering concept of operations can
be built around e.g., a Eurofighter equiped force with greater overall
effectiveness.

Compared to an F-22, an EF has about the same flight performance and
persistence and substantially higher RCS. The on-board ESM suites are of
similar generation and presumed capability. The EFs have more ordinance
stations in their reference configuration, giving more stowed kills. EFs
are _not_ built around cooperative engagement. None of the Eurofighter
consortium's claims point in that direction.  Instead, EFs are classical
fighters with each platform depending primarily on its own sensors.

Neither platform is intended to fight itself. Its effectiveness has to be
assessed against a set of enemy systems.

Against RADAR, the F-22 should be much more effective than the EF.
Because the detection range is a 4th root function of RCS a conjectural
ratio of 10 between an F-22 and an EF RCS yields detection ranges of an
F-22 against RADAR of 56% that of an EF. If the ratio is 100, the
detection range is only 31%. In terms of search volume, a 10X difference
in RCS reduces the effectiveness of enemy RADARs to 31% and 100X reduces
search volume to 10%.

Against ESM, individual EFs have advantage over F-22s as long are the air
mass stays clear and the IRST works. When the information network starts
up, the rate at which individual F-22s radiate drops tremendously and the
advantage goes away. Remember that the network can function with F-22s
alone since the returns from a single aircraft can be shared with all
others in a strike. Consider a force of 10 F-22 flying at 1000kt. In the
simplest scenario, with each fighter making a sweep in turn and linking
the data to the others, if a sweep rate of 2 per minute (for the
formation) is used, the position uncertainty of any F-22 by ESM is 83
miles, much more than the expected detection range for active sensors
against them. If AWACS or other off-platform data sources are available,
the situation gets _much_ worse.

That being the case, what CONOPS for an EF equiped force delivers "90% of the
effectiveness" of a similar number of F-22s? Enquiring minds et cetera.

--
He didn't inhale and she didn't swallow
Bill said it, I believe it and that settles it.




From: "Paul F Austin" <paustin@digital.net>
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: Do we even need an F-22?
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 1999 20:27:03 -0400

Brian wrote in message <379D090C.273B@usa0.no0bulk0email0.0net>...
>Ed Rasimus wrote:
>> Ask any U.S. soldier on active duty for the last thirty years when was
>> the last time he saw an enemy aircraft overhead. The point of air
>> superiority/supremacy/dominance is to control the airspace, denying
>> the enemy the opportunity to operate his aircraft and providing us
>> unlimited opportunity to employ hours.
>
>Do we currently or in the forseeable future see a threat to that?
>Something our current fighters cannot handle? I just don't see this
>extreme need for the F-22.


Repeat after me: Sunk Cost. The billions spent on the F22 have gone to money
heaven. You may prefer more spent on a mud-mover but the development of the
F22 is substantially paid for.

The unit production costs of even 300 F22s is tiny compared to the cost of
an "F27" air superiority fighter that gets started in 2007 when <oh shit> we
start losing aircraft to enemy fighters over Elbonia and have to develop a
replacement for the obsolete F15C/Ds. Keep in mind that this "F27" isn't
going to get into squadron service until 2017 at the earliest. In the
meantime, your son goes down in flames.

All this sound melodramatic and it is. The fact remains that based on US
post-war track record, it's impossible to design, develop, test, produce and
transition to squadron service in less than 10 years. The fact _also_
remains that the F22 is paid for.

It would be the height of irresponsiblity to throw that development away,
which is what Congressman Jerry Lewis may do in a game of chicken with the
Clinton administration. No one had talked about _why_ the House zeroed the
F22 production money.

Lewis' committee wants the Clinton administration to stop taking
expeditionary money (Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, Haiti...) out of normal Defense
appropriations that have to live under the budgetary cap passed in 1998.
There're good arguements for doing that but Lewis' committee chose the F22
as a system that Clinton _likes_ to put on the chopping block. The House
expects Clinton to fold and ask for special defense appropriations outside
the budget caps.

The American people expect bloodless victory now. That expectation is idiocy
but the reason the expectation exists is because the US has technological
hegemony over all opponents _now_. We made the investment during the Reagan
years and produced equipment so much better than our opponents that the
"wars" we've fought or see on the horizon are cake walks. Don't miss that
point though that we've made very little investment in maintaining that
technological edge since 1989. F22 is one of the few platforms that's ready
for production to _maintain_ that edge.

Conscience, that quiet voice that says "Someone may be watching"

Paul F Austin
paustin@digital.net




From: "Paul F Austin" <paustin@digital.net>
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: Do we even need an F-22?
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 1999 22:30:19 -0400

Brian wrote in message <379E5C71.1FC3@usa0.no0bulk0email0.0net>...

>Paul F Austin wrote:
>>
>> Brian wrote in message <379D090C.273B@usa0.no0bulk0email0.0net>...
>> >Ed Rasimus wrote:
>> >> Ask any U.S. soldier on active duty for the last thirty years when was
>> >> the last time he saw an enemy aircraft overhead. The point of air
>> >> superiority/supremacy/dominance is to control the airspace, denying
>> >> the enemy the opportunity to operate his aircraft and providing us
>> >> unlimited opportunity to employ hours.
>> >
>> >Do we currently or in the forseeable future see a threat to that?
>> >Something our current fighters cannot handle? I just don't see this
>> >extreme need for the F-22.
>>
>> Repeat after me: Sunk Cost. The billions spent on the F22 have gone to
>> money heaven. You may prefer more spent on a mud-mover but the
>> development of the F22 is substantially paid for.
>
>Yet we still need to pay $130-180 million per copy.

That number is the amortized development cost and has nothing what so ever
to do with unit production costs. Figure it out. Current F-22 "cost" numbers
bandied about in the press are about $180M. About half that is the sunk
development cost.

Just as the "$2B B-2" would have cost $300M in production (Northup was
willing to sign a $275M per unit FFP contract), F22 unit production costs
will be under $100M. That's still a lot but _much_ cheaper than re-doing the
development for a later fighter.

>
>> The unit production costs of even 300 F22s is tiny compared to the cost
>> of an "F27" air superiority fighter that gets started in 2007 when <oh
>> shit> we start losing aircraft to enemy fighters over Elbonia and have
>> to develop a replacement for the obsolete F15C/Ds. Keep in mind that
>> this "F27" isn't going to get into squadron service until 2017 at the
>> earliest. In the meantime, your son goes down in flames.
>
>Let's face it, future sons are more likely to face a ground threat.
>Everyone keeps stressing the need to "save future pilots", what about
>future soldiers?

Look, the fact is, the Air Force is never going to put ground-pounder
support at the top of the list. The Army needs organic systems to do all the
support from FLOT to about 50 miles behind the enemy lines. That system is
probably a helo augmented with arty systems.

The fact remains, air supremacy has made life _very_ easy for US troops.
Don't fuck with a working proposition.


>> All this sound melodramatic and it is. The fact remains that based on US
>> post-war track record, it's impossible to design, develop, test, produce and
>> transition to squadron service in less than 10 years. The fact _also_
>> remains that the F22 is paid for.
>
>If it's paid for, why will it cost a few billion for 6 production
>frames?

Because that $1.8B appropriation is for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP).
The bulk of that money goes into final production engineering for high rate
production. If you look historically at the "unit cost" of every LRIP
airplane in the past 30 years, it's been frighteningly high compared to
serial production costs.

Conscience, that quiet voice that says "Someone may be watching"

Paul F Austin
paustin@digital.net




From: "Paul F Austin" <paustin@digital.net>
Newsgroups: rec.aviation.military
Subject: Re: F-22 gets cancelled?
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 1999 22:35:08 -0400

Chuck Zheng wrote
>Sorry I missed out the news article.  Which part of F-22 project did
>Congress cancel exactly?

The House voted to delete a $1.8B appropriation line for low-rate initial
production of 6 F-22s. The Senate voted for full funding. The House-Senate
conference will sort it out.

Conscience, that quiet voice that says "Someone may be watching"

Paul F Austin
paustin@digital.net




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